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Laws consist of two components: the ‘obligations’ they express and the 
‘incentives’ designed to enforce them. In this paper we run a public 
good experiment to test whether or not obligations have any 
independent effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. The results show 
that, for given marginal incentives, different levels of minimum 
contribution required by obligation determine significantly different 
levels of average contributions. Moreover, unexpected changes in the 
minimum contribution set up by obligation have asymmetric dynamic 
effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the 
descending trend of cooperation, whereas an increase induces a 
temporary re-start in the average level of cooperation. Nonetheless, 
obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time. 
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In human society individual behaviours and social interactions are often regulated by 
means of the law. In particular laws set constraints and determine how people should 
behave in social dilemma situations, where individual interests and the common good 
conflict. This is apparent by observing the role of legal rules in the provision of public 
goods, in local environmental control, in road safety and in numerous other situations.  
In such contexts, laws may serve the purpose to induce efficient behaviours, thus 
aligning individual and collective interests. Following the definition suggested by Raz 
(1980), laws are made by two components: the ‘obligations’ they express and the 
‘incentives’1 designed to enforce them. While the impact of incentives on individual 
behaviour has been widely studied, the economic literature has generally neglected to 
reflect on the role of obligations. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the effects of 
obligations on individual behaviour in social dilemmas. 
According to the traditional economic analysis of law, legal rules can influence 
individual behaviours only through the effect of incentives on individual material 
payoffs (see Polinsky and Shavell, 2000; Cooter and Ulen, 2003). Despite its success in 
other contexts, this view can hardly explain why most people cooperate and obey legal 
rules even when the expected sanctions are very low (see Tyler, 1990; Robinson and 
Darley, 1997; Kahan, 2004). In order to provide a rationale for these phenomena, legal 
theorists and economists have recently advanced several explanations which focus on 
the interactions between laws and social norms2. Two theories are particularly 
noteworthy. The first suggests that, in social interactions with coordination problems or 
conflicting interests and where multiple equilibria are possible, laws may act as 
coordination devices which channel individual beliefs about others' behaviours to a 
common focal point tipping the system into a certain equilibrium (see Cooter, 1998; 
Bohnet and Cooter, 2003; McAdams and Nadler, 2005). According to the second line of 
reasoning, laws may influence individual behaviours even through direct psychological 
effects on individual preferences. In particular, as long as individuals have personal 
norms suggesting what the ‘fair rules’ to follow are, the message conveyed by the law 
may urge people to update their values and subsequently their behaviours (see Kahan, 
1997 and Cooter, 1998).  
These theories have gained a widespread and growing success among theoretical 
scholars. However, there is a marked paucity of consistent empirical evidence3. In this 
paper we try to fill this gap by analysing experimentally the separate effect of 
obligations on individual behaviours in a social dilemma situation. In particular we run 
a finitely repeated public good game in which individuals are required to contribute a 
minimum fraction of their endowment for a public project facing a given structure of 
incentives. According to the traditional theory, only the economic incentives drive 
individual behaviours. This means that, for given marginal incentives, the level of 
                                                
1 With the term ‘incentives’ we refer both to rewards and sanctions. 
2 See for example Ellickson (1991) and the literature quoted by McAdams and Rasmusen (forthcoming). 
3 As far as we know recent papers testing some of these possible effects of laws are: Cardenas et al. 
(2000), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Tyran and Feld (forthcoming), Bohnet and Cooter (2003), 
McAdams and Nadler (2005).  
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minimum contribution set up by obligation is not expected to affect individual 
behaviours. We want to test this conclusion versus the alternative hypothesis that, for 
given marginal incentives, different levels of the minimum contribution set up by 
obligation may imply different levels of cooperation. In order to test these hypotheses, 
we let vary across the different treatments the minimum fraction of the endowment the 
individuals are required to contribute while we keep the marginal incentives unaltered. 
Our results show that obligations per se significantly affect the average level of 
individual contributions. Nevertheless, in all treatments, average contributions tend to 
decline over time, suggesting that, with low incentives, obligations per se cannot sustain 
cooperation in repeated interactions. Moreover, we provide evidence that unexpected 
changes in the level of the minimum contribution set up by obligation have asymmetric 
dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the pattern of 
deterioration of cooperation over time, whereas an increase triggers a re-start in the 
cooperation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe in detail the experimental 
design. Section 3 analyses and discusses the experimental results. The last section draws 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Experimental Design 
2.1. Individual Payoffs and Theoretical Predictions 
Consider 2≥n  individuals ( ),...,1 nj =  who are asked to contribute to a public good for 
10 periods. In each of the 10 periods each individual receives an endowment y  and has 
to decide how much to keep for herself and how much to invest into the public project. 
Moreover suppose that an obligation of minimum contribution ya <ˆ  is imposed by an 
external authority. This obligation fixes a minimum level of contribution that one 
should provide to finance the public good. This obligation is enforced by a structure of 
incentives. In particular each individual is audited by the authority with a probability p 
(with 10 << p ). In case of audit, if the individual’s actual contribution ia  is lower than 
the required contribution â , she has to pay a penalty equal to )ˆ( iaag − , where 1>g ; 
on the contrary, if her actual contribution ia  is higher than the minimum one required, 
the audited individual receives a positive reward equal to )ˆ( aag i −
4. No penalty or 
reward is assigned to an audited individual whose actual contribution is exactly equal to 
the minimum contribution set up by obligation. 
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. We set 
the parameters such that the following inequalities hold: nm /1>  and 1<+ pgm . The 
                                                
4 The parameters y, p and g are held constant for all 10 periods. 
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first inequality implies that the aggregate monetary payoff is maximized when each 
individual fully cooperates. The second inequality assures that the expected individual 
monetary return from one unit of contribution is negative.    
A well supported result in the experimental literature on public good5 is that in a given 
population (or sample), some individuals are fully self-interested, that is they care only 
about their own monetary payoff, whereas some others have social preferences, that is 
they are also other-regarding and/or process-regarding. Consider in our setting the 
optimal choice of a risk neutral and fully self-interested individual. Her optimal 
contribution, *ia , is the value of ia  which maximizes (1). The first order condition of 








i                                                                                                    (2) 
Hence the dominant strategy for a (risk-neutral) self-interested individual is always the 
full free-riding: 0* =ia . This result depends crucially on the assumption that 
1<+ pgm 6, meaning that the monetary incentives are not sufficiently high to make the 
expected return from one unit of contribution higher than one unit kept for herself. 
Condition (2) predicts that that the level of minimum contribution â  required by 
obligation does not affect the optimal choice of a self-interested individual. This result 
is straightforward under the hypotheses that a self-interested individual cares only about 
her monetary payoff and that obligations do not affect the individual monetary 
outcomes. 
Notice that in condition (2), given the values of the parameters p  and g , the marginal 
effects of the monetary incentives designed to enforce the obligation are fixed and do 
not depend on the minimum contribution required â . This is a crucial condition which 
is necessary in order to separate the effect of obligations from that of incentives and it is 
achieved by introducing a reward (symmetric to the penalty) for the individuals 
contributing less than the minimum contribution. Instead, considering only a 
probabilistic penalty for the individuals who contribute less than â , we would obtain 
two distinct first-order conditions for the maximization problem, one for the interval 
aai ˆ≤  and the other one for the interval aai ˆ> . But in this case different levels of â  
would imply different monetary incentives, which instead we want to keep fixed in 
order to isolate the effect of different obligations.  
Consider now the possibility that some individuals have social preferences, i.e. they 
care not only about their monetary payoffs, but they have also other-regarding and/or 
process regarding preferences. We conjecture that, in a public good environment, the 
level of minimum contribution set up by obligation could affect their behaviours for two 
possible reasons: 
                                                
5 For a survey of the literature on public good experiments, see Ledyard (1995).  
6 Instead, with 1>+ pgm ,  the optimal contribution for a self-interested individual would be the entire 
endowment, whereas, with 1=+ pgm , she would be indifferent to any feasible level of contribution. In 
both cases the setting would not represent a public good game.  
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1) An individual may be a reciprocator, i.e. she is willing to cooperate (despite 
monetary incentives to free-ride) if the other members of their group cooperate to a 
sufficient extent. We capture this motive by assuming a reciprocity payoff, ir , 










 in the group: ( )2iii aar −−= λ  , where the parameter 0≥iλ  represents 
individual i ’s reciprocity motive. For a purely self-interested individual, 0=iλ . Since 
in each period all contributions are made simultaneously, individual i  does not know a  
but she has some beliefs about it. We call eia  the individual i ’s expectations about a
7. 
Given this reason of behaviour, an obligation, highlighting a certain level of 
contribution, could be a focal point for individual beliefs. In formal terms, â  could 
affect eia  and, as a consequence, also individual i ’s  optimal choice. 
2) An individual may have internalized a norm of contribution and may suffer 
emotional consequences when her actual contribution departs from her personal norm. 
We can capture this reason of behaviour by assuming, as in Bowles and Gintis (2003), 
that individual i  may suffer a psychic cost ic  when her actual contribution is different 
than the contribution pia  required by her personal norm of behaviour
8: 
( )2ipiii aac −−= β  , where the parameter 0≥iβ  indicates how much individual i  is 
susceptible of deviations from her personal norm of contribution. For a fully self-
interested individual, 0=iβ . An obligation, expressing a certain level of ‘fair 
contribution’ for the community, could affect an individual i ’s personal norm of 
contribution: in this case, individual i  will adapt her behaviour to the values expressed 
by the obligation in order to minimize a negative emotional cost. In formal terms, â  
could influence pia  and, as a result, also individual i ’s optimal choice.  
Taking into account these possible reasons of behaviours, in each period individual i  
will decide her optimal contribution *ia  maximizing the following expected utility: 
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The first order condition for an interior optimum is: 











EU βλ            (4) 
                                                
7 Notice that, for reciprocators, the public good game becomes a coordination game (Camerer and Fehr, 
2002).  
8 As in Bowles and Gintis (2003), we assume that an individual suffers negative emotional consequences 
not only when she contributes less than her personal norm of contribution, but also, symmetrically, when 
she contributes more than her ideal. Indeed, in this last case, she is subtracting resources from other 
‘worthy’ purposes about which she also has personal norms (for example, in our setting, her own self-
interest).  
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Condition (4) allows for an interior optimal contribution of an individual whose 
preferences are not fully self-interested. Moreover, notice that in (4) the obligation does 
not affect material incentives, but it may alter an individual’s optimal contribution by 
modifying her belief about others’ behaviour and by changing her personal norm of 
contribution. These two possible channels are strictly related. Indeed if the obligation 
affects an individual’s preferences, it is plausible that it influences also her belief about 
others’ preferences and behaviours. At the same time, if the obligation affects an 
individual’s belief about others’ behaviours, it is plausible that it alters also her personal 
belief about the ‘fair’ norm of contribution and hence her social preferences. For this 
reason we do not try to isolate the two components, but we simply aim at testing 
whether or not obligations affect individual behaviours in the public good game, i.e. 
whether or not *ia  is a function of â .  
As long as obligations significantly affect the optimal choices of individuals having 
social preferences and these individuals represent a relevant fraction of the population, 
obligations can affect the average pattern of cooperation to the public good emerging in 
a certain population. 
2.2. Experimental Treatments, Parameters and Information Conditions 
The experiment consists of a repeated public good game lasting for 10 periods. 
Differently from a standard voluntary public good game, an obligation of minimum 
contribution is fixed exogenously. This obligation indicates a minimum level of 
contribution that each subject should provide for the public good9. We implement three 
different conditions for the minimum contribution: a ‘zero obligation condition’ (‘O 
condition’)10 where the minimum contribution is zero, a ‘low obligation condition’ (‘L 
condition’) where in each period subjects are required to contribute a fraction of 2/5 of 
their total endowment and a ‘high obligation condition’ (‘H condition’), where the 
minimum contribution required in each period corresponds to 4/5 of an individual’s 
total endowment. The obligation expressed by the minimum contribution required is 
enforced by a structure of incentives: in particular there is a probability of audit and a 
probabilistic penalty (reward) when contributions are lower (higher) than the level of 
minimum contribution required11. As we are interested in the effects of obligations per 
se, we keep as fixed across all treatments the level of marginal incentives, i.e. the 
probability to be audited and the penalty/reward rate. On the contrary, the level of the 
minimum contribution required by obligation changes across the treatments. In the 
instructions we stress that the obligation fixes a minimum contribution required from 
each individual, but that in each period the feasible contribution for each participant 
                                                
9 Notice that the minimum level of contribution required is an individual obligation. Differently from a 
step level public good game (see among the others: Offerman et al. (2001) and the literature quoted 
there), we do not impose any collective threshold to be reached in order to provide the public good. As in 
a step level public good game, we maintain that the presence of the obligation may affect beliefs about 
others’ cooperation. Notice that our setting does not imply multiple equilibria for self interested players.  
10 In the ‘0 condition’ treatment there is no explicit mention to any minimum contribution required. 
Moreover notice that in this treatment there is a probabilistic reward (proportional to the actual 
contribution of an audited individual) but not a probabilistic penalty (since negative contribution are 
obviously not allowed).  
11 The penalty (reward) is proportional to the negative (positive) difference with respect to the minimum 
contribution required. 
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varies between 0 and her endowment. Moreover we explain in detail the consequences 
of each choice on individual payoffs. 
The incentives are fixed at a very low level. This choice is due to two reasons: firstly, 
we aim at testing whether or not an obligation of minimum contribution affects 
cooperation when incentives are such that the optimal strategy for self-interested 
individuals is the full free-riding even if they are risk adverse within reasonable degrees. 
Secondly, we want to minimize the possible bias in our results caused by differences in 
risk preferences across samples (even if we control for this bias using the test described 
in section 2.3). 
As we are interested in the possible effects of a change in the obligation on the overall 
level of cooperation, in some sessions we extend the public good game for other 10 
periods. Hence, in these sessions we implement a repeated public good game for twenty 
periods divided into two segments of 10 periods. In the second 10 periods segment we 
change the minimum contribution required with respect to the first 10 periods segment. 
In all treatment conditions subjects are informed that the experiment lasts exactly 10 
periods. When a second segment is added, subjects play the first treatment condition 
without knowing that the experiment would be continued for other 10 periods. After the 
period 10, the subjects are informed that a new experiment is beginning, lasting again 
10 periods. 
Table 1 provides some information about the different experimental sessions and 
treatments. In each session participants are divided into 6 groups of size 6 (except for 
session 6 where we had 5 groups of size 6) and play the repeated public good game. In 
Session 1 subjects play the first 10-periods segment with the ‘O condition’ and the 
second 10-periods segment with the ‘L condition’. In Session 2 subjects play the first 
segment under the ‘L condition’ and the second segment under the ‘O condition’. In 
Session 3 the ‘L condition’ is implemented for the first segment and the ‘H condition’ 
for the second segment. Session 4 begins with the ‘H condition’ in the first segment and 
then implements the ‘L condition’ in the second segment. In Session 5 and Section 6 




 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS AND SESSIONS 
Session Number of Subjects
Minimum Contribution Required 
1st 10-periods Segment
Minimum Contribution Required 
2nd 10-periods Segment
1 36 O L
2 36 L O
3 36 L H
4 36 H L
5 36 L -
6 30 H -  
The experiment was conducted in a computerized laboratory where subjects 
anonymously interacted with each other12. No subject is ever informed about the 
                                                
12 For conducting the experiment we used the experimental software ‘z-Tree’ developed by Fischbacher 
(1999). 
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identity of other group members. The composition of group is held constant during the 
whole experiment (partner condition) and subjects know it. In all treatments, the 
individual endowment in each period is equal to 25=y  tokens. The marginal per capita 
return of the public good is fixed at 3.0=m . In each period contributions take place 
simultaneously. Each group is audited with a probability of 
2
1
. In case a group is 
selected, only one of the six members of the group is randomly chosen to be audited. 






1 =×=p  . The 
sanction/reward rate is equal to 2.1=g . Both the probability of being audited and the 
sanction/reward rate are held constant for all treatments. In all treatments the payoff 
functions and the parameters y , n , p  and g are common knowledge. Furthermore in the 
instructions we stress that in each period the probability of being audited is independent 
from the probability of having been audited in a former period and does not affect the 
probability of being audited in a following period. The contributions’ audit takes place 
by a computerized random extraction and all subjects are informed about it. The 
minimum level of contribution required by obligation is 0ˆ =a  in the ‘O condition’, 
10ˆ =a  in the ‘L condition’ and 20ˆ =a  in the ‘H condition’. 
At the end of each period, participants are informed about the total contribution to the 
public good in their group, and receive information about the results of the auditing 
process. In particular they know whether or not there has been an audit in their group, 
whether or not their own contribution has been audited and, in this case, the effect of the 
audit on their own payoff. However, in case their group is audited but they have not 
been selected for the audit, they do not know the identity of the audited group mate. 
This condition guarantees that participants do not take their choices in order to avoid 
being ashamed by group mates in the case they are audited and rules out any reputation 
effect. 
2.3. The Role of Risk Preferences: a Control Test 
In presence of a probabilistic punishment/reward enforcing a certain obligation, risk 
preferences may contribute to explain differences in individual contributions. In 
particular, ceteris paribus, risk adverse people will contribute closer to the minimum 
level of contribution required by obligation because they prefer to insure themselves.  
In order to control for the possible effect of risk preferences, at the end of each public 
good session we run a lottery to single out subjects’ risk preferences. In the lottery we 
implement an experimental design similar to that implemented by Holt and Laury 
(2001). The experimental test is based on five choices between the paired lotteries 
reported in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 
 PAIRED LOTTERY CHOICES 
Option A Option B Payoff Differences (A-B)
1/10 100 tokens; 9/10 80 tokens 1/10 170 tokens; 9/10 10 tokens 56
3/10 100 tokens; 7/10 80 tokens 3/10 170 tokens; 7/10 10 tokens 28
5/10 100 tokens; 5/10 80 tokens 5/10 170 tokens; 5/10 10 tokens 0
7/10 100 tokens; 3/10 80 tokens 7/10 170 tokens; 3/10 10 tokens -28
9/10 100 tokens; 1/10 80 tokens 9/10 170 tokens; 1/10 10 tokens -56  
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In each paired lottery, subjects choose between an alternative A and an alternative B. 
Once all subjects have taken their choice, a pair of lotteries is randomly chosen and the 
computer assigns to each subject the option she has chosen before. Finally the lottery is 
run in order to determine each subject’s payoff. 
Following the method proposed by Holt and Laury (2001), we classify individual risk 
preferences according to the sequence of choices taken in the lottery (see table 3). 
 
TABLE 3 
 RISK PREFERENCES ASSOCIATED TO LOTTERY CHOICES 
Sequence of Choices Risk type
A-A-A-A-A highly risk averse
A-A-A-A-B risk averse
A-A-A-B-B or A-A-B-B-B risk neutral
A-B-B-B-B risk lover
B-B-B-B-B highly risk lover
Other Sequences inconsistent choices  
 
3. Experimental Results 
All sessions were held in October 2004 at the University of Siena (Italy). In total, 210 
subjects took part in the experiment. All subjects were students recruited from 
undergraduate courses in different fields. Nobody had previously participated to a 
public good game. Each subject took part only in one of the six sessions. An 
experimental session lasted about 60 minutes and the average earning was 12 euros 
(about 16 dollars), including a show-up fee of 3 euros. 
3.1. Obligations and Cooperation Levels 
In figure 1 we report the time series of average contributions from period 1 through 10 
for the three different levels of minimum contribution required.  
Figure 1 shows that similar average contributions characterise the treatment in which 
there is no minimum contribution required (‘0 condition’) and the treatment in which 
the minimum contribution required is 10 tokens (the ‘L condition’). Instead, average 
contributions in the treatment where the minimum contribution required is 20 tokens 
(‘H condition’) are clearly higher than in the other two treatments characterised 
respectively by the ‘0 condition’ or and ‘L condition’. Moreover we notice that, in all 
treatments, average contributions tend to decline over time at similar rates. 
In Table A1 in Appendix 1 we present data on average contributions disaggregated by 
group. It is worth noting that average contributions are very similar in the sessions 
characterised by the same level of minimum contribution set up by obligation. 
Moreover the group level data confirm the results shown in figure 1 for data aggregated 








































In Table 4 we present the results of a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test13 of the difference in 
contribution levels between treatments in periods 1-1014. We find that mean 
contributions under the ‘H condition’ are higher at significant statistical levels than 
mean contributions both in the treatment with the ‘0 condition’ and in the treatment 
implementing the ‘L condition’. Instead, average contributions under the ‘0 condition’ 
are not significantly different at conventional statistical levels than average 
contributions under the ‘L condition’.  
 
TABLE 4 
 MANN-WHITNEY TEST RESULTS FOR DIFFERENCES IN CONTRIBUTIONS BETWEEN TREATMENTS  
Treatment Conditions MC=10 MC=20
MC=0 z=-0.667; p=0.505 z=-2.717; p=0.0067
MC=10 z=-2.714; p=0.0067
MC=Minimum Contribution Required  
 
These results suggest that, for given marginal incentives, the minimum contribution set 
up by obligation can affect average cooperation. In particular, when the minimum 
contribution required is high (‘H condition’), the level of cooperation is significantly 
higher than in presence of low or null obligation. 
In order to better interpret the previous findings based on comparisons of average 
contributions, it is worth analysing how the patterns of individual data vary across 
                                                
13 The unit of observation in the statistical test is the group average contribution.  
14 We report both the values of the test (z) and the p-values (p). 
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treatments. In figures A1-A6 in Appendix 1 we report the distributions of individual 
contributions in the first round of sessions 1-6. As one can notice, the distribution of 
individual contributions in the first period is quite similar in sessions 1, 2, 3 and 5 
(where the minimum contribution is 0 or 10 tokens), whereas it differs in a relevant way 
in sessions 4 and 6, where the minimum contribution is fixed at 20 tokens. In particular, 
while the distribution of contributions tends to be concentrated around the level of 10-
12 tokens when the ‘0 condition’ or the ‘L condition’ is implemented, under the ‘H 
condition’ the distribution is significantly shifted towards the right, with individual 
contributions concentrated around the level of 20-25 tokens. Instead the number of 
individuals contributing 0 or close to 0 (self-interested individuals) is quite similar 
across all sessions (with the partial exception of session 5, characterised by a larger 
proportion of self-interested subjects).  
We can give this evidence the following interpretation. In the first round of a public 
good game, selfish individuals do not contribute, whereas conditional co-operators 
make a positive contribution expecting to be reciprocated. In our sample, when no 
minimum contribution is required, in the first round reciprocators tend to contribute 
about 10-12 tokens. When the minimum contribution required is 10 tokens, a very 
similar pattern emerges in both our samples. A possible explanation of these findings is 
that, fixing exogenously the minimum contribution required at a level very close to 40-
50% of the endowment (as in our ‘L condition’), reciprocators tend to find confirmation 
(on average) of their preferences and beliefs when no obligation exists, so they will 
contribute at similar levels than in the no obligation case. This may explain why there is 
no significant difference in average contributions between the treatment with the ‘0 
condition’ and the one with the ‘L condition’. 
Instead, when the minimum contribution required is significantly higher than 40-50% of 
the endowment (as in our ‘H condition’), reciprocators are induced to contribute more, 
making average contributions under the ‘H condition’ significantly higher than under 
the two other conditions. Since marginal incentives are the same, this result can be 
explained only by arguing that reciprocators’ beliefs and/or preferences are influenced 
by the message highlighted by the obligation of minimum contribution.  
However, notice that the trend of average contributions from period 1 through 10 is 
decreasing at similar rates for the different levels of minimum contribution required15. 
This suggests that obligations affect the levels of cooperation but cannot sustain 
cooperation over time when the monetary incentives are low. We can give this evidence 
the following explanation: whatever is the level of minimum contribution and the initial 
levels of average contributions, in the presence of selfish individuals who never 
contribute, reciprocators notice that they are matched with free riders and refuse to be 
taken advantage of, so they gradually reduce their contributions.16  
The following two statements summarize the evidence discussed above: 
 
                                                
15 This evidence confirms the standard result that in repeated linear public good games cooperation tends 
to deteriorate over time; see for example: Andreoni and Miller (1993), Isaac, Walker and Williams 
(1994), and Weimann (1994) 
16 This is the standard explanation of why cooperation tends to decay in voluntary public good games (see 
Camerer and Fehr, 2002).  
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Result 1 
Obligations affect the levels of average contributions to a public good. In particular 
average contributions are significantly higher when the minimum contribution required 
by obligation is sufficiently higher than average contributions as emerging in the ‘no 
obligation’ case. 
Result 2 
Contributions tend to decline over time (at similar rates) for any minimum contribution 
required. This means that exogenously imposed obligations cannot sustain cooperation 
when incentives are such that free riding is the optimal strategy for self-interested 
individuals.   
 
3.2. Changes in Obligations and Cooperation Levels 
In sessions 1-4 individuals play a first segment of 10 periods with a certain level of the 
minimum contribution. At the end of the 10th period, subjects are informed that they 
have to play a second segment of 10 periods of the same game, but with a different level 
of the minimum contribution. In figure 2 we report the time series of average 
contributions for the first segment (labelled as periods: 1 to 10) and the second segment 
(labelled as periods: 11 to 20) of sessions 1-4. 
  
FIGURE 2 





































It is worth noting that in sessions where the minimum contribution is reduced in the 
second segment of the game (in session 2, shifting from L to 0 and in session 4 from H 
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to L), no re-starting effect is observed at the 11th round: average contributions in the 11th 
period of these sessions are very close to average contributions in the 10th period and the 
contribution rates keep on declining at the same rate.  
Instead, in sessions where the minimum contribution is raised in the second segment, 
we observe a relevant upwards re-starting effect. In session 1 (from 0 to L), average 
contributions in the 11th period are higher than average contributions in the 10th period 
and are very close to average contributions in the 1st period. In session 3 (from L to H), 
average contributions in the 11th period are not only higher than in the 10th, but they also 
overshoot the 1st period average contributions. Then, after the 11th period, contributions 
decline over time in both sessions. 
In table 5 we report the results of a nonparametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs test17 
applied, for each session, to evaluate the difference in average contributions between the 
first segment (periods 1-10) and the second segment (periods 11-20) and between the 
last period of the first segment (period 10) and the first period of the second segment 
(period 11). As one can notice, in sessions 1 and 3 (where the minimum contribution 
increases in the second treatment), the differences in average contributions between 
periods 1-10 and periods 11-20 are not significant, whereas the difference in 
contributions between period 10 and 11 are significant. For sessions 2 and 4, the 
opposite result is obtained: there is a significant difference in average contributions 
between periods 1-10 and periods 11-20, whereas there is no statistically significant 
difference in contributions between period 10 and period 11.  
 
TABLE 5 
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS TEST RESULTS FOR DIFFERNCES IN AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
In order to better interpret the previous results, we analyse individual data by comparing 
the distributions of individual contributions respectively in the 10th and 11th period of 
sessions 1-4 (figures A7-A14 in Appendix 1). In sessions 1 and 3, characterised by an 
increase in the minimum contribution, the distributions of individual contributions tend 
to shift towards the right when the new condition is implemented. In particular in 
session 1 individual contributions are concentrated around 0-2 tokens in the 10th period, 
when the level of minimum contribution is still 0 tokens, whereas they become 
concentrated around 10-13 tokens in the 11th period, when the level of minimum 
contribution is 10 tokens. Instead, in session 3, individual contributions tend to be 
concentrated around 0 tokens and 10 tokens in the 10th period (when the level of 
minimum contribution is 10 tokens), whereas they are polarised around 0 and 20 tokens 
in the 11th period. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that with the 
implementation of the new condition some reciprocators are pushed to contribute more 
and closer to the level of minimum contribution set up by obligation.  
                                                
17 The unit of observation in the statistical test is the group average contribution.  
Session 1           
MC1=0 - MC2=10 
Session 2               
MC1=10 - MC2=0 
Session 3           
MC1=10 - MC2=20 
Session 4        
MC1=20 - MC2=10 
1st segment - 2nd segment z=-0.314; p=0.7532 z=2.201; p=0.0277 z=1.365; p=0.1730 z=2.201; p=0.0277 
10th period - 11th period z=-2.201; p=0.0277 z=-0.943;p=0.3454 z=-2.201;p=0.0277 z=0.314; p=0.7532 
MC1: minimum contribution required in the 1st 10-periods segment 
MC2: minimum contribution required in the 2nd 10-periods segment 
 14 
Instead, in sessions 2 and 4, characterised by a decrease in the minimum contribution, 
we do not observe relevant changes in the distributions of individual contributions from 
period 10 to period 11. We can interpret this result as follows: when the new treatment 
is implemented, reciprocators are not pushed to re-start their conditional cooperative 
behaviour when a lower obligation is highlighted.  
A last point deserves our attention. While we have found that having no or low 
obligation in the first 10 periods of a public good game does not have a relevant impact 
on the average level of cooperation, we have also found that shifting from a 10-periods 
treatment with no obligation to a 10-periods treatment with low obligation is different 
than shifting from low obligation to null obligation. We interpret this result as follows: 
in the two treatments the reciprocators experience a similar pattern of decay of 
cooperation in the first 10-periods segment. However, when the new treatment is 
implemented, reciprocators are not pushed to re-start their conditional cooperative 
behaviour when a lower obligation is highlighted, whereas they are when a higher 
obligation is highlighted. Also this result suggests that obligations matter.  
Summarizing, these results suggest that unexpected changes in the level of the 
minimum contribution required by obligation have asymmetric dynamic effects on the 
levels of cooperation. Lowering the minimum contribution does not alter the pattern of 
decay of cooperation, whereas increasing the minimum contribution gets cooperation to 
re-start (even with overshooting of the initial level when the minimum contribution 
passes from 10 to 20). Nevertheless, in both cases, in subsequent periods cooperation 
tends to decline over time.  
The following statement summarizes the above evidence: 
Result 3 
An unexpected increase in the minimum contribution required by obligation triggers a 
temporary re-start in the cooperation deteriorated in the first 10 periods. Instead, an 
unexpected reduction in the minimum contribution does not alter the descending trend 
of cooperation.  
 
3.3. Controlling for Differences in Risk Preferences 
In table 6 we report the frequencies of subjects by class of risk preferences as obtained 
by running the experiment described in paragraph 2.3.  
 
TABLE 6 
FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS BY CLASSES OF RISK PREFERENCES 
Classes of risk preferences/Session Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Session 6
Highly risk averse 4 6 5 3 5 9
Risk averse 6 5 5 5 8 4
Risk neutral 16 12 12 15 12 9
Risk lover 1 1 3 0 0 1
Highly risk lover 0 0 0 1 0 1
Inconsistent choices 9 12 11 12 11 6  
 
It is worth noting that the frequencies are very similar for the samples of the different 
sessions, with the partial exception of session 6, where highly risk adverse subjects 
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represent a higher proportion in the sample. Furthermore, we notice that the number of 
risk-lover or highly risk-lover individuals is very small. 
In order to test whether or not differences in risk preferences are relevant in explaining 
differences in contributions, we have subdivided our sample into three groups: the first 
group is composed of risk-neutral individuals, the second is composed of risk-adverse 
individuals and the third one is composed of highly risk-adverse individuals18. 
Moreover we compute for each subject an index given by the mean (for all periods) of 
the differences between her contribution and the minimum contribution required. Then 
we apply a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of the difference in this index between each 
pair of groups. The Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of the difference in this index between 
risk neutral and highly risk adverse individuals yields z = -0.084, which is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.933). The same test applied to the 
difference in this index between risk neutral and risk adverse individuals yields z = 
0.026, which is certainly not statistically significant (p = 0.979). Finally, the difference 
between highly risk adverse and risk adverse individuals is also found not statistically 
significant (z = -0.315, p = 0.753). 
Hence, differences in subjects’ risk preferences across the different samples do not 
affect our results for two reasons. First, the distribution of subjects by class of risk 
preferences is very similar in the different sessions. Second, there is no significant 
difference in individual behaviours with respect to the minimum contribution between 
highly risk adverse, risk-adverse and risk-neutral individuals. This last result can be 
explained by the fact that the probability to be audited in each round and the penalty rate 
are very low. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have tested experimentally the separate effect of obligations on 
individual behaviours in a social dilemma situation. In particular, we have reported the 
results of a finitely repeated public good game where individuals were obliged to 
contribute a minimum fraction of their endowment for a public project facing a given 
structure of (low) incentives. Keeping as fixed across all treatments the level of 
marginal incentives whereas changing the level of minimum contribution required by 
obligation, we have tested whether obligations per se can affect individual behaviours. 
Our results show that the level of minimum contribution required by obligation 
significantly affects both average contributions and their distributions in the samples. 
Nevertheless, in all treatments, average contributions tend to decline over time, 
suggesting that, with low incentives, obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation in 
repeated interactions. Furthermore, our results show that unexpected changes in the 
level of minimum contribution set up by obligation have asymmetric dynamic effects on 
the levels of cooperation: a weakening in the obligation does not alter the pattern of 
deterioration of cooperation, whereas an increase induces a (provisional) re-start in 
cooperation.  
                                                
18 We have not considered risk-lover or highly risk-lover individuals, who represent a negligible fraction 
of subjects in the sample, nor individuals whose choices are inconsistent.  
 16 
These results support the idea that lawmaking can affect individuals’ behaviour not only 
by modifying their material payoffs, but also by shaping their preferences and beliefs. 
Nonetheless the effect of obligations on individual values and beliefs is not enough to 
sustain cooperation and overcome social dilemmas. Indeed, law can exert these effects 
only on those subjects whose preferences are not purely self-interested. As far as the 
society consists of a significant proportion of self-interested individuals, exogenous or 
endogenous incentives able to direct the behaviour of these subjects are required in 
order to sustain cooperation. In this case the obligations set up by the law, shaping 
individual values and beliefs, can influence the emergence of social norms supported by 
sanctions and can contribute to determine the ultimate level of cooperation we observe 
in a certain community. 
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AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS IN SESSIONS 1-6: ROUNDS 1, 1-10 (AVERAGE), 11, 11-20 (AVERAGE) 
Session Group Period 1 Periods 1-10 Period 11 Periods 11-20
1 1 15.67 12.22 12.33 6.82
2 8.17 6.42 13.33 9.17
3 13.00 10.72 10.50 10.25
4 12.83 9.47 9.00 9.08
5 10.17 8.18 11.67 9.50
6 15.00 4.00 8.00 7.20
Overall Mean 12.47 8.50 10.81 8.67
2 1 9.17 8.97 11.00 7.63
2 9.83 10.05 8.33 6.78
3 10.00 8.23 7.50 3.53
4 12.67 10.63 10.17 7.63
5 12.17 10.10 7.50 8.27
6 17.17 20.35 19.17 17.55
Overall Mean 11.83 11.39 10.61 8.57
3 1 13.33 15.12 22.83 20.47
2 9.50 6.88 6.17 2.57
3 8.33 6.73 9.33 6.45
4 13.67 12.93 14.17 15.78
5 10.67 8.82 16.83 14.65
6 12.50 11.12 11.17 16.30
Overall Mean 11.33 10.27 13.42 12.70
4 1 12.67 9.17 8.50 6.07
2 13.00 15.13 12.83 11.55
3 22.17 20.55 20.67 19.72
4 20.50 19.67 15.00 13.92
5 18.33 17.83 18.33 13.38
6 17.67 16.63 10.00 9.08
Overall Mean 17.39 16.50 14.22 12.29






Overall Mean 9.17 7.66
















DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE SAMPLES (PERIOD 1) 
 
 FIGURE A1: SESSION 1 (MC=0), ROUND 1   FIGURE A2: SESSION 2 (MC=10), ROUND 1 
 
  
 FIGURE A3: SESSION 3 (MC=10), ROUND 1  FIGURE A4: SESSION 4 (MC=20), ROUND 1  
 
   









































































































































































DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE SAMPLES (PERIODS 10 AND 11) 
 
 FIGURE A7: SESSION 1, ROUND 10 (MC=0)   FIGURE A8: SESSION 1, ROUND 11 (MC=10) 
 
   
   
 FIGURE A9: SESSION 2, ROUND 10 (MC=10)  FIGURE A10: SESSION 2, ROUND 11 (MC=0) 
   
 FIGURE A11: SESSION 3, ROUND 10 (MC=10)  FIGURE A12: SESSION 3, ROUND 11 (MC=20) 
 
    





















































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Instructions 
 
The following instructions were originally written in Italian. We document the 
instructions used in session 3 (both for the public good game and the lottery).  
 
2A - The public good game 
 




Welcome in the Lab and thanks for participating in this experiment. You are now taking 
part to an economic experiment in which, depending on your decisions, you can earn a 
considerable amount of money.  
From now on, it is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during 
the experiment. If you violate this rule you will be excluded from the experiment 
and from all payments.  
Hereafter we describe the experiment in detail. Please, read the following instructions 
carefully. It is in your and our best interest that you fully understand the instructions, so 
please feel free to ask any question. 
 
How will your income be paid? 
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in tokens. At the end of 
the experiment the total amount of tokens you have earned will be converted to Euros at 
the following rate: 
100 tokens = 1 Euro 
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of 3 Euros for participating. At the end 
of the experiment your earnings and the 3 Euros for participating will be immediately 
paid to you in cash. 
 
How long is the experiment? How many people do take part to it? 
The experiment is divided into different periods. In all, the experiment consists of 10 
periods. In each period the participants are divided into groups of six. Therefore you 
will therefore be in a group with 5 other participants. The composition of the groups 
will not change during the experiment. Therefore in each period your group will 




Which kind of decisions do you have to take during the experiment? 
In each of the 10 periods of the experiment you have to decide the amount of your 
contribution to a common project. 
At the beginning of each period, as all your group members, you will receive an 
endowment of 25 tokens. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. In 
particular, you have to decide how many of the 25 tokens you want to contribute to the 
project (notice that you have to choose a natural number between 0 and 25). The 
remaining tokens (25 - your contribution) are kept for yourself.  
 
What is the aim of the project? 
The project returns to the group a common product. The common product is an amount 
of tokens higher than the total sum of the contributions to the project made by the 
members of your group. The common product is divided equally among all the group 
members. Each group member obtains an individual product. In particular, the sum of 
the individual contributions to the project will be multiplied by 1.8 before being divided 
equally among the six group members.  






G = sum of the individual contributions of all group members to the project; 
6 = number of group members. 
An example. 
Suppose that the sum of the contributions to the project from all the group members is 
60 tokens. The project returns a total amount of: 
1088.160 =×  tokens 
This amount of tokens will be equally redistributed among the group members. Hence, 
each member of the group earns from the project: 
183,060
6
8.160 =×=×  tokens. 
Therefore, your contribution to the project also raises the income of the other group 
members. On the other hand, you earn an income from each token contributed by the 
other members. For each token contributed by any other member you will earn 0.3 
tokens. 
Remember that, in each period, your feasible contribution is any integer number 
between 0 and 25. 
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The minimum contribution  
In each period, a minimum contribution to the project equal to 10 tokens is required to 
each individual. This is the minimum amount of tokens you should provide for the 
public project. The amount of tokens required as minimum contribution will not change 
during the experiment, remaining the same (10 tokens) for all the 10 periods. 
 
The control 
In each period there will be the possibility that the contribution of a group member will 
be audited. The choice will be random. The computer, after all members of your group 
have made their decision, will randomly select an even or odd number. The extraction 
of an even number implies that there will be an audit of the contributions; on the other 
hand if the result of the extraction is an odd number the contributions will not be 
audited. If the contributions within the group will be audited, the computer will 
randomly choose an integer between 1 and 6, corresponding to the identification 
number of the subject that will be audited. For each member of the group the 
probability of being audited in a certain period will be the probability of the 
extraction of an even number multiplied by the probability of being extracted in a group 







1 ≅=×=p  
This procedure will be repeated in each period; notice that the probability of being 
audited in a certain period is independent from the probability of being audited in 
a former or following period. 
 
What is the effect of the control? 
If the contribution of the audited member is equal to the minimum contribution 
required, the control will not have any effect on her earnings. 
If the contribution of the audited member is lower than the minimum contribution 
required, an amount of 1,2 tokens will be subtracted from her endowment for each 
token of difference between the minimum contribution and her actual contribution.  
If instead the contribution of the audited member is higher than the minimum 
contribution required, an amount of 1,2 tokens will be added to her endowment for 
each token of difference between the minimum contribution and her actual contribution.  
Notice that the tokens subtracted from the audited subjects who contribute less than the 
minimum contribution will not be added to the common project and the tokens received 
by the audited subject whose contribution is higher than the minimum one will not be 
subtracted from the common project. 
An example 
Suppose that the minimum contribution is fixed to 3 tokens  
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- Suppose that the subject contributes 1 token. In case her contribution is audited, 2,4 
more tokens will be subtracted from her endowment, that is to say: 
×2,1 (minimum contribution – actual contribution of the subject) = ( ) 4,2132,1 =−× . 
- Suppose now that the subject contributes 5 token. In case her contribution is audited, 
she will receive 2,4 more tokens, that is to say:  
×2,1 (actual contribution of the subject–minimum contribution) = ( ) 4,2352,1 =−× . 
 
How will your income be calculated? 
In each period, after all group members have decided how much to contribute to the 
common project and after a possible control, your income is calculated by summing 
three components: 
1. The tokens you have kept for yourselves, that is to say:  
Endowment – your contribution 
2. The individual product from the common project: 
Total group contributions 
6
8,1×  
3. The effect of a possible audit: 
a. 0, if you have not been audited or if you have been audited but you have 
contributed exactly 10 tokens (the minimum contribution). 
b. if you have been audited and you have contributed less than the 
minimum contribution required, your income will be reduced by:  
(minimum contribution – your actual contribution) 2,1×   
c. if you have been audited and you have contributed more than the 
minimum contribution, your income will be increased by:  
( your actual contribution –  minimum contribution) 2,1×   
The income in each period can be expressed by the following expression:  
( ) 2,1
6
8,1 ×−+×+−= mcGcDs  
where: s = income in each period; D = initial endowment; c = your contribution to the 
project; G =total group contribution to the project; m = minimum required contribution. 
 
The input screen 
Hereafter we describe the screens that you will see during the experiment. At the 




The number of the period appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right 
corner you can see how many more seconds remain for you to decide about your 
contribution. In the first 2 periods you have 45 seconds, whereas in the remaining 8 
periods you have 30 seconds. Your decision must be made before the time displayed is 
0 seconds. In the middle of the screen, it appears the minimum contribution. Below it, 
you can see your endowment and then the input field where you have to write a number 
between 0 and 25. On the right down corner there is the button OK to confirm your 
choice.  
Let’s sum up the procedure. You have to decide how much to contribute to the project 
by writing a number between 0 and 25 in the input field. By deciding how much to 
contribute you decide also how much you keep for yourself, that is to say: (25 – your 
contribution). After having written your contribution, you have to click on the OK 
button. Once you have done this, your decision can no longer be revised. 
After all members of your group have made their decision, the computer will extract an 
even or odd number in order to decide whether or not a member group will be audited. 
If it is decided to audit a contribution in the group, another extraction will determine 
which member of the group will be audited.  
In case of control, if the contribution of the audited member is equal to the minimum 
contribution, her earnings will not be affected. If the contribution of the audited member 
is lower than the minimum contribution, some tokens will be taken from her 
endowment. If the contribution of the audited member is higher than the minimum 
required, some tokens will be added to her endowment.  
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The income screen 
After this procedure, the following screen (‘income screen’) will appear: 
On the income screen, you will see the sum of the contributions of the members of your 
group to the common project (including your contribution) and you will know if the 
contributions of a member of the group have been audited or not. 
The income screen shows you also your total income including the possible reduction or 
increase of tokens in case your contribution has been audited. Notice that if your 
contribution is audited, the other members of the group know that there has been an 
audit within the group but they do not know which specific person has been audited. 
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to 
see the income screen. If you have finished with it before the time is expired, please 
press the OK button. 
 




Now you will participate to a second experiment. This second experiment is analogous 
to the first except for a change. The experiment lasts 10 periods as before. In each 
period you have to decide how much to contribute to a common project. At the 
beginning of each period your endowment is equal to 25 tokens. 
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The aim and the return from the common project does not change with respect to the 
first experiment.  
 
The minimum contribution  
Nonetheless there is a change with respect to the first experiment. In each period the 
minimum contribution required to the common project is now set up at the level of 20 
tokens. The minimum contribution required will not change during the experiment, 
remaining the same (20 tokens) for all the 10 periods. 
 
The control  
As before, in each period there is the possibility that the contribution of one member of 
the group is audited. In particular, as before, for each subject the probability of being 
audited in a certain period is equal to 
12
1
 (about 8,33 %). 
What is the effect of the control? 
If the contribution of the audited member is equal to the minimum contribution 
required, the control will not have any effect on her earnings. 
If instead the contribution of the audited member is lower than the minimum 
contribution required, an amount of 1,2 tokens will be subtracted from her endowment 
for each token of difference between the minimum contribution and her actual 
contribution.  
If instead the contribution of the audited member is higher than the minimum 
contribution required, an amount of 1,2 tokens will be added to her endowment for each 
token of difference between the minimum contribution and her actual contribution 
 
Thank you for participating!  
 
 
2B - The lottery 
Instructions 
 
You are now taking part to a last experiment in which, depending on your decisions, 
you can earn an additional sum of money. We ask you not to talk with others until 
the end of the experiment. Hereafter the experiment is described in detail. 
If you do not have perfectly understood the rules of the experiment, do not hesitate to 




What is the income from the experiment? 
In the experiment your income is calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment, 
your income in tokens will be converted to euros at the rate of: 
100 tokens =  1 
The income will be paid to you in cash together with the show up fee of   3 and the 
income gained in the previous experiment. 
In this experiment you are not part of any group. Your decisions do not influence 
others’ income and others’ decisions do not influence your income.  
 
What do you have to decide in the experiment? 
Hereafter you will see a screen with a sequence of 5 choices you have to take. For 
each choice you have to indicate if you prefer a lottery A or a lottery B. 
Let’s give an example of the possible choice:  
     Lottery A    Lottery B 
CHOICE 1 70% 50 tokens           50% 90 tokens 
 30% 200 tokens                                   50% 100 tokens 
Lottery A gives a gain of 50 tokens with a probability of 70% and a gain of 200 tokens 
with a probability of 30%. Lottery B gives a gain of 90 tokens with a probability of 
50% and a gain of 100 tokens with a probability of 50%. You have to indicate if you 
prefer the lottery A or the lottery B. 
You must take 5 choices, where each choice is between a lottery A and a lottery B. 
 
How your earnings are calculated? 
Once you have taken the five choices (and so indicated five lotteries, one for each pair 
A-B), the computer will randomly extract one of the five lotteries you have chosen. At 
this point, given the chosen lottery, the computer will extract your gain accordingly to 
the probability indicated by this lottery.  
Example. Suppose the computer extracts the following lottery (one of those you have 
chosen): 
60%  100 tokens 
40%  180 tokens 
At this point the computer will extract your gain from the experiment: with a probability 
of 60% it will extract a gain of 100 tokens, whereas with a probability of 40% a gain of 
180 tokens.  
The equivalent in euros of your gain will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment together with the show up fee ( 3) and your income from the previous 
experiment. 
 
